A linha wiki não oferece nenhuma citação nem qualquer elaboração, mas está amplamente correta. Descobriu-se que o orbitador realmente tinha uma forma favorável para se livrar,
The Langley report does state that the Orbiter shape and mass [182] properties are good for ditching, but given the structural problems and deceleration loads, that is little consolation.
Isso foi abordado no relatório do Challenger , em última análise, as altas cargas simplesmente não levariam a uma sobrevivência impacto que teve a ver com as altas velocidades de aproximação e massa de carga potencialmente insegura (do ponto de vista de desaceleração).
In 1974 and 1975, ditching studies were conducted at Langley Research Center. Although test limitations precluded definitive conclusions, the studies suggested that the loads at water impact would be high. The deceleration would most probably cause structural failure of the crew cabin support ties to the fuselage, which would impede crew egress and possibly flood the cabin. Furthermore, payloads in the cargo bay are not designed to withstand decelerations as high as those expected, 2 and would very possibly break free and travel forward to the crew cabin. The Langley report does state that the Orbiter shape and mass [182] properties are good for ditching, but given the structural problems and deceleration loads, that is little consolation.
Orbiter ditching was discussed by the Crew Safety Panel and at Orbiter flight techniques meetings before the first Shuttle flight. The consensus of these groups was that (1) ditching is more hazardous than suggested by the early Langley tests, and (2) ditching is probably not survivable.
This view was reiterated in the September 9, 1982, letter from Griffin to Abrahamson:
"We also suggest no further effort be expended to study bailout or ditching. There is considerable doubt that either case is technically feasible with the present Orbiter design. Even if a technical solution can be found, the impact of providing either capability is so severe in terms of cost and schedule as to make them impractical."
There is no evidence that a Shuttle crew would survive a water impact. Since all contingency aborts and all first stage abort capabilities that are being studied culminate in a water impact, an additional provision for crew escape before impact should also be considered.
Astronaut Paul Weitz expressed this before the Commission on April 3, 1986:
*"My feeling is so strong that the Orbiter will not survive a ditching, and that includes land, water or any unprepared surface....
"I think if we put the crew in a position where they're going to be asked to do a contingency abort, then they need some means to get out of the vehicle before it contacts earth, the surface of the earth."*
A Nasa publicou um estudo sobre a análise de veículos transportados pelo ar aqui (com foco no ônibus espacial) ciência pesada, mas uma leitura interessante sobre o assunto.
