Isso é parte da razão, mas parte do que o filme retrata é quantos pequenos descuidos aparentemente contribuíram para o desastre. Você não pode reduzi-lo a um único motivo.
A seguinte análise do desastre da wikipedia explica bem os múltiplos fatores que levaram à desastre.
Lista:
- Escaladores demais : (congestionamento) levando a gargalos na Hillary Dê um passo e evite que os escaladores se virem na hora certa
- Experiência insuficiente : Rob Hall e Scott Fischer e suas equipes finalmente teve que empurrar-se além de suas habilidades para cuidar de seus clientes
- Aspecto comercial : Havia pressão adicional para que todos chegassem ao topo para que pudessem ter o valor de seu dinheiro, e a presença de Jon Krakauer também aumentou a pressão para que eles tivessem uma escalada bem-sucedida, como ele estaria escrevendo sobre isso. / li>
- Baixos níveis de oxigênio : os níveis de oxigênio podem ter contribuído para muitas das más decisões e erros cometidos.
- Mais confiança : Rob Hall e Scot Fischer tinham uma relação competitiva e reputação por levar as pessoas ao topo, e também tiveram um grande recorde de sucesso. Algo estava prestes a dar, dadas as probabilidades estatísticas de fatalidades na montanha.
The disaster was partially caused by the sheer number of climbers attempting to ascend (34 climbers on 10 May 1996). The congestion of the crowd, combined with delays in securing ropes, caused bottlenecks at the Hillary Step and the Balcony and delayed the ascent of many climbers. Therefore, many summitted after the safe 14:00 turnaround time.
Jon Krakauer has suggested that the use of bottled oxygen and commercial guides, who personally accompanied and took care of all pathmaking, equipment, and important decisions, allowed otherwise unqualified climbers to attempt to summit, leading to dangerous situations and more deaths. In addition, he wrote that the competition between Hall and Fischer's guiding companies may have led to Hall's decision not to turn back on 10 May after the pre-decided time for summiting of 14:00; Krakauer also acknowledges that his own presence as a journalist for an important magazine for mountaineers may have added pressure to guide clients to the summit despite growing dangers. He proposed banning bottled oxygen except for emergency cases, arguing that this would both decrease the growing pollution on Everest—many discarded bottles have accumulated on its slopes—and keep marginally qualified climbers off the mountain. He does point out, however, that climbing Everest has always been a highly dangerous endeavour even before the guided tours, with one fatality for every four climbers who reach the summit. Furthermore, he notes that many of the poor decisions made on 10 May were after two or more days of inadequate oxygen, nourishment, and rest (due to the effects of entering the death zone above 8,000 m/26,000 ft). He concludes that decisions made in such circumstances should not be strongly criticized by the general population, who have not experienced such conditions.
Krakauer also elaborated on the statistical curiosities of fatality rates on Everest and how 1996 was "business as usual". The record number of 12 fatalities in the spring climbing season that year was 3% of the 398 climbers who had ascended above Base Camp—slightly below the historical average of 3.3% at that time. Additionally, 12 climbers had died that season, and 84 had reached the summit. This is a ratio of 1 in 7—significantly less than the historical average prior to 1996 of 1 in 4. Since the fatality rates on Everest have dropped considerably, accounting for the volume of climbers in 1996 compared to prior years, 1996 was statistically a safer-than-average year.
In May 2004, Kent Moore, a physicist, and John L. Semple, a surgeon, both researchers from the University of Toronto, told New Scientist magazine that an analysis of weather conditions on 11 May suggested that freak weather caused oxygen levels to plunge by around 6% resulting in a 14% reduction in oxygen uptake.