Trecho de "Primeira mão: Evolução da cabine de voo de transporte de tripulação da 2-Person"
Early in the preliminary design effort, Boeing had taken a careful look at the in service performance and accident history of previous airplane designs. The conclusions were interesting:
- In flight troubleshooting sometimes led to more serious problems, occasionally jeopardizing the safety of the flight.
- The flight engineer’s intense focus on systems problems often distracted one or both of the pilots, sometimes resulting in no one “flying the airplane.”
Jet engine reliability was much higher than piston engines and they required little or no in flight troubleshooting or adjustment.
- Certain high workload periods during departure and arrival left little time for outside watch nor much time for handling abnormal events.
In support of industry work to establish rational external vision requirements for transport airplanes, Boeing developed a computer model that determined the relative collision threat value of the visual space around the aircraft. Because airplanes are in motion and at a positive angle of attack, the computer model showed that the collision threat is concentrated generally forward and below the longitudinal axis of the airplane.
In response to these findings the design team took a different approach to the 737 flight deck:
- A concerted effort would be made to simplify systems designs to increase reliability and to eliminate or greatly reduce the need for in flight trouble shooting.
- A Flight Deck design group would participate in all flight deck design decisions and would have considerable authority in the design of controls, indicators, and operating concepts across all airplane systems.
- Workload assessment would be used as an integral element of design to adjust functionality and location of equipment and controls.
- Operating procedures would be simplified and shortened to reduce distractions and provide ample time for outside watch.
- The autopilot would be improved to better support operations in the terminal area not just in cruise.
- The pilot’s stations would be designed to maximize external vision in the primary collision threat zone.
Portanto, parece que muitas das mudanças que facilitaram o movimento para uma cabine de comando da tripulação 2 foram de procedimento e não de engenharia. Os motores a jato naquela época não exigiam atenção e ajustes constantes. Parece que esse movimento em direção a uma contagem reduzida de cockpit foi o resultado de "muitos cozinheiros na cozinha" e, embora não tenha sido mencionado explicitamente, parece que Vôo Eastern Air 401 foi um fator determinante (Edit: ou pelo menos eles queriam evitar algo assim, o EA401 não aconteceu até o 1972, quando o 737 foi introduzido no 1968).
No entanto, suponho que isso não responda completamente ao que você está procurando, tenho certeza de que gostaria de ver a entrada específica que o "Flight Design Design Group" ofereceu para a colocação de controles e indicadores. Eu acho que uma maneira de descobrir isso seria comparar o layout do cockpit do 727 e 737, tanto quanto posso encontrar, essas decisões de design não são publicadas.